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A Mean Field Competition

Tuesday, October 24, 2017 at 11:40am - 12:45pm

We introduce a mean field game with rank-based reward: competing agents optimize their effort to achieve a goal, are ranked according to their completion time, and paid a reward based on their relative rank. First, we propose a tractable Poissonian model in which we can describe the optimal effort for a given reward scheme. Second, we study the principal--agent problem of designing an optimal reward scheme. A surprising, explicit design is found to minimize the time until a given fraction of the population has reached the goal. (Joint work with Marcel Nutz)
Location   Hill 705

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Mathematical Finance Master's Program

Department of Mathematics, Hill 348
Hill Center for Mathematical Sciences
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
110 Frelinghuysen Road
Piscataway, NJ 08854-8019

Email: finmath (at)
Phone: +1.848.445.3920
Fax: +1.732.445.5530